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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Petitioner,
Case No. 20020504-SC

vs.
DAVID HITTLE,
Defendant/Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred upon the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to the provisions
of Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(3)(a).

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. Whether the Court of Appeals correctly found the trial court committed plain error
as a matter of law when the trial court failed to strictly comply with Rule 11 by not
advising Hittle of his right to a speedy trial?
2. Whether the Court of Appeals correctly found that because Hittle was not advised of
his substantial constitutional right to a speedy trial, his plea was not knowing or
voluntary and thus harmful?

"On certiorari review, 'we review the court of appeals' decision, not the opinion
of the [trial] court.' State v. Weeks, 2002 UT 98, f 10, 458 Utah Adv. Rep. 3. That
decision is then reviewed for correctness. Id" State v. Leatherbury, 2003 UT 2, 17,
467 Utah Adv. Rep.3; State v. Trane, 2002 UT 97, f 16, 57 P.3d 1052.

CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 11 is relevant to the issues on
appeal and is attached in the Addenda.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

David Hittle's conviction for criminal non-support, a class A misdemeanor, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-201 (R. 44-46), was reversed by the Court of
Appeals and the State appeals. State v. Hittle, 2002 UT App 134, 47 P.3d 101.
B.

Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition

David Hittle was charged by information filed in Third District Court on April
10, 2000, with criminal non-support, a Class A misdemeanor and a Third Degree
Felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-201 (R. 44-46).
On April 20, 2000, Hittle pleaded guilty to the class A misdemeanor charge,
agreed to pay all child support arrearages, and agreed to 36 months probation (R. 56;

139: 1-2). However, during the Rule 11 colloquy, the trial court failed to inform Hittle
of his right to a speedy trial. The trial court stated the following:
Do you understand that by entering this plea today . . . you are giving up your
right to go to trial; [your] right to confront and cross examine witnesses, to
present evidence on your behalf or to refrain from presenting evidence if you []
wish and to make the State carry the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt
all of the elements of the offense as charged; to have witnesses brought on your
behalf to court to testify, with the compulsion of a subpoena if necessary. You
have the right not to commit yourself unless you choose to take the stand in
which case you would be subject to cross examination. You have the right to, if
you were to be convicted and found guilty following a trial by an impartial
decision maker, or a jury in this matter, you would have the right to appeal.
You're giving up those rights by entering this plea today.
Hittle, 2002 UT App 134, f 2. At the change of plea hearing, Hittle executed a written
statement he understood these rights he was waving, although the Plea Agreement
Hittle signed did not include a provision waiving the right to a speedy trial (R. 56; 139:
21-22). That statement was incorporated into the record at the change of plea hearing
(R. 139: 21-22).
On May 17, 2000, Hittle filed a timely motion to withdraw his guilty plea (R.
62-62). The trial court denied the motion (R. 110), and Hittle appealed to the Utah
Court of Appeals (R. 110; 116).
The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, finding that the trial court
committed plain error by failing to advise Hittle of his constitutional right to a speedy
trial and that this error was harmful because "if the defendant is not fully informed of
his rights prior to pleading guilty, then the guilty plea cannot be voluntary." Hittle,
2002 UT App 134, f f 6, 10. The Court of Appeals did not reach other issues Hittle

raised, such as other omissions under Rule 11 and ineffective assistance of counsel. Id,
at1 l , n . l .
On October 23, 2002, this Court granted the State's petition for certiorari.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
Hittle was ordered to pay $275 per month child support for his daughter under a
divorce decree (R. 44-46). Between February 1, 1997, and April 5, 2000, Hittle failed
to fully pay total child support (R. 46).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Court of Appeals' decision correctly held that a trial court must comply with
Rule 11 and advise defendants of their constitutional right to a speedy trial before a
guilty plea can be accepted.
In this case, Rule 11 requirements were not satisfied where the trial court utterly
failed to advise Hittle of his right to a speedy jury trial. Therefore, Hittle's plea
agreement could not have been knowing or voluntary because the record is clear that
the Hittle was not informed of this substantial constitutional right. This error was
obvious because precedence and Rule 11 specifically requires defendants to be informed
of all their rights before a guilty plea can be taken.
The Court of Appeals was correct to presume that Hittle was prejudiced by a
Rule 11 violation because the record is clear that Hittle was not informed of his right to

a speedy trial. Because Hittle was not advised of this substantial constitutional right as
required by Rule 11, this Court should presume harm.
In the alternative, if this Court reverses, Hittle asks this Court to remand to the
Court of Appeals for consideration of the other issues Hittle raised before that court.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT A
DEFENDANT MUST BE INFORMED OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL BEFORE HE CAN WAIVE THIS
RIGHT AND BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT CAN ACCEPT HIS
GUILTY PLEA

The Court of Appeals correctly held that a trial court must strictly comply with
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 11 and thus followed this Court's precedent in
State v. Maguire, 830 P.2d 216 (Utah 1991), by requiring trial courts to "not accept a
guilty plea until it finds that the defendant knows that by pleading guilty, he is waiving
'the right to a speedy public trial.'" State v. Hittle, 2002 UT App 134, 1 6, 47 P.3d
101, (citing Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 11(e)(3)). Hittle was not informed
of his constitutional right to a speedy trial either orally or in the plea affidavit. Hittle,
2002 UT App 134, at 1 6.
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure specifically require trial courts to refuse a
plea of guilty until the court has found "the plea is voluntarily made" and "the
defendant knows of the r i g h t . . . to a speedy public trial before an impartial jury."
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 11(e). The Court of Appeals' decision is

correct because it follows this Court's precedence which requires a trial court to strictly
comply with Rule 11 when taking a guilty plea.

A.

The Court of Appeals' Decision Follows This Court's Precedence For
Rule 11 Strict Compliance

The Court of Appeals reviewed both the oral colloquy and plea affidavit and
found that neither advised Hittle of his constitutional right to a speedy trial. Hittle, 2002
UT App 134, at f 6. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals found that this was plain and
obvious error. Id.
This Court has placed the responsibility for establishing strict compliance with
all constitutional and Rule 11(e) requirements squarely on the trial court. State v.
Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1311, 1313 (Utah 1987).
In elucidating this requirement, this Court stated in State v. Maguire, 830 P.2d
216 (Utah 1991), that this requirement may be fulfilled by "multiple means, e.g.,
transcript of the oral colloquy between the court and defendant, contents of a written
affidavit that the record reflects was read, understood, and acknowledged by defendant
and the court, contents of other documents such as the information, presentence
reports, exhibits, etc., similarly incorporated into the record, and so on." Id. at 218.
This Court further stated:
It is critical, however, that strict Rule 11 compliance be demonstrated on the
record at the time the ... plea is entered. Therefore, if an affidavit is used to aid
Rule 11 compliance, it must be addressed during the plea hearing.... Then the
affidavit itself ... can be incorporated into the record. The efficiency-promoting

function of the affidavit is thereby served, in that the court need not repeat,
verbatim, Rule 11 inquiries that are clearly posed and answered in the affidavit.
Id. at 217; (citing State v. Smith, 812 P.2d 470, 477 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied
836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992)). In an attempt to further clarify the strict compliance test,
this Court explained that "strict compliance can be accomplished by multiple means so
long as no requirement of the rule is omitted and so long as the record reflects that the
requirements ha[ve] been fulfilled." Id.
Thus, strict compliance requires trial courts to "personally establish that the
defendant's guilty plea is truly knowing and voluntary and establish on the record that
the defendant knowingly waived his or her constitutional right[]" to a speedy trial. See
State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88, 1 11, P.3d 1242 (quoting State v. Abeyta, 852 P.2d 993,
995 (Utah 1993)) (emphasis in original).
In this case, the State wrests the Court of Appeals' decision by claiming it
requires "a rote recitation of all the rule 11 requirements in the colloquy and the
affidavit before it will find that a court has strictly complied with rule 11" (Brief of
Petitioner at 7). The State is incorrect and misinterprets the Court of Appeals' decision
in Hittle.
In this case, the Court of Appeals relied on Maguire and precedence outlined in
State v. Tarnawiecki, 2000 UT App 186, 5 P.3d 1222, in finding that the trial court did
not strictly comply with Rule 11 because it utterly failed to advise Hittle of his right to
a speedy trial. See Hittle, 2002 UT App 134 at f 6.

Maguire specifically rejected the idea that "rote recitation of all the Rule 11
elements" must be orally stated during the plea colloquy. Maguire, 830 P.2d at 218,
n.2. Moreover, Maguire allows "strict compliance" to be satisfied by "multiple
means." Id, at 217.
The Court of Appeals not only reviewed the plea colloquy in finding that the trial
court failed to inform Hittle of his right to a speedy trial, but it also reviewed the plea
agreement. Hittle, 2002 UT App 134 at 1 2. This Court specifically endorsed this
course of action, where both the plea colloquy and plea agreement should be reviewed
to determine whether a defendant's waiver was voluntary and knowing. See Maguire,
830 P.2d at 217-18.
The State claims that the Court of Appeals failed to look at "the relevance of any
other record factors which may have had a bearing on the substantive goal or rule 11."
(Brief of Petitioner at 9). However, the State fails to offer any evidence that Hittle was
informed in any other manner of his right to a speedy trial. Moreover, the State even
fails to show that Hittle knew or understood this right.
In arguing that the Court of Appeals failed to look at other relevant factors, the
State is forced to rely on the claim that the trial judge "took extreme care in making his
determination that the defendant's plea was knowing and voluntary," (Brief of
Petitioner at 9), because there is nothing in the record that shows that Hittle was
informed of his right to a speedy trial. The record shows that Hittle was unsure about
taking a guilty plea and therefore the trial judge wanted to make sure Hittle understood

what he was doing (R. 140:3). However, the record is clear that Hittle was never
informed of his right to a speedy trial; therefore Hittle could not have knowingly or
voluntarily waived that right.
Moreover, the State's claim misconstrues the "strict compliance" test clarified in
Maguire. While Maguire and other precedence allow a knowing and voluntary waiver
to be satisfied by "multiple means," it is clear that the record must reflect that the
defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived each right. See Visser, 2000 UT 88, at \
11; Abeyta, 852 P.2d at 995; Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1311. The Court of Appeals'
decision clearly does not hold, as argued by the state, that rote recitation of Rule 11 is
now required by trial courts when taking guilty pleas; the decision merely follows this
Court's precedence that defendants must be informed of constitutional and Rule 11
rights before a knowing and voluntary plea can be taken and that the record must reflect
that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived these rights. It is equally clear
that the right to a speedy trial is both a constitutional and Rule 11 right, and Hittle was
not informed of this right as this Court has previously required.

B.

Precedence and Rule 11 Requires Trial Courts to Inform Defendants
of Their Right to A Speedy Trial By Jury Before the Taking of a
Guilty Plea.

The State maintains that a defendant does not need to be informed of his right to
a speedy trial before entering a guilty plea and before this right can be knowingly and

voluntarily waived (Brief of Petitioner at 10). The State's position is completely
contradictory to Rule 11 requirements as interpretated by this Court.
Rule 11 specifically requires trial courts to make sure a defendant's plea of guilty
is knowing and voluntarily made and that the defendant knows of "the right to a speedy
public trial before an impartial jury." Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 11(e).
Rule 11(e)(3) clearly outlines two substantial rights: a right to a speedy trial by jury and
a right to trial by an impartial jury. As outlined above, this Court requires strict
compliance with Rule 11, although this does not necessarily mean rote recitation of the
rights listed. See Visser, 2000 UT 88, at \ 11.
However, Visser certainly cannot mean that trial courts are no longer required to
inform defendants of their substantial constitutional rights. Clearly the right to a
speedy trial is substantial. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
requires "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury...." Further, Rule 11 requires the same as the Sixth
Amendment. The constitutional right to a speedy trial is a distinct right of criminal
defendants, separate from the right to a trial before an impartial jury. See United States
Constitution, Amendment IV; see also Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 11(e).
The whole purpose in requiring trial courts to make sure defendants understand
and know the rights they are waiving when pleading guilty to a crime will only be
frustrated if this Court accepts the State's argument. To claim that as long as a
defendant is informed of his "right to trial" completely satisfies Rule 11 is inconsistent

with the plain and ordinary meaning of "the right to a speedy public trial before an
impartial jury." Hittle was guaranteed both the right to a speedy trial and the right to
trial before an impartial jury under Rule 11(e) and he was not informed of his separate
and distinct right to a speedy trail. It was impossible for Hittle to knowingly and
voluntarily waive a right which the record shows the trial court never informed him
about. Rule 11(e) requires defendants to be informed of both rights. While trial courts
may not be required to specifically state the word "speedy," surely a defendant must be
aware that he has a right to a trial in the near future compared to a right to trial at some
future time.^ The fact that trial courts are not required to recite Rule 11(e) verbatim in
no way takes away from the requirement that defendants must understand these rights
before they can be knowingly and voluntarily waived. The record is abundantly clear
that the trial court completely failed to inform Hittle of his right to a speedy trial; thus
the record is absent any evidence that Hittle knowingly and voluntarily waived this
right.
The State asserts that Hittle is inconsistent with State v. Martinez, 2001 UT 12,
26 P.3d 203, and by implication overrules Hittle (Brief of Petitioner at 10). In
Martinez, this Court concluded that a trial court strictly complied with Rule 11 by
informing the defendant about "the right to a jury trial." Id. at \ 22-25. There is no
suggestion that the trial court used the terms "impartial" and "speedy," yet this Court
held that the trial court colloquy "strictly complied" with Rule 11. Id. However,
nothing in Martinez suggests that the trial court did not use these terms in the plea

colloquy. Id. Moreover, whether the rights these terms convey were communicated to
the defendant in Martinez was not an issue before the court in that case. See Id.
Therefore, Martinez does not control and is not dispositive.

C.

The Trial Court's Error Was Obvious

Hittle asserts that the trial court's error was obvious because Rule 11(e) requires
trial courts to inform defendants of the right to a speedy trial. "To show obviousness
of the error, [defendant] must show that the law was clear at the time of trial." State v.
Garcia, 2001 UT App 19, \ 16, 18 P.3d 1123; see also State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236,
239 (Utah App. 1997). Hittle further asserts that case law is abundantly clear that Rule
11(e) must be strictly complied with.
The trial court had the guidance of State v. Visser (Visser I), 1999 UT App 19,
973 P.2d 988, rev'd on other grounds by State v. Visser {Visser II), 2002 UT 88, 22
P.3d 1242. In Visser I, the Court of Appeals held strict compliance with Rule 11
required that a trial court specifically inform the defendant of his right to a speedy trial
before an impartial jury. Id. at Vi 16-18. Although this Court reversed that decision in
Visser II, Visser I was reversed not because a defendant is not entitled to be informed of
his right to a speedy trial, but because the record in that case reflected that the
defendant had in fact been informed of his rights. See Visser II, at \ 13.
Moreover, although this Court has not specifically addressed this precise issue,
the Court of Appeals outlined in Tarnawiecki that "strict compliance, rather than

substantial compliance, with Rule 11 is required when accepting a guilty plea."
Tarnawiecki, 2000 UT App 186 at f 12. It is obvious that the trial court did not have
the benefit of Tarnawiecki at the time Hittle's plea was entered; however, this Court
has specifically adopted a "strict compliance" test which superseded the "record as a
whole" test. See Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1312; see also Maguire, 830 P.2d at 217-18.
Moreover, Maguire specifically stated that "no requirement" of Rule 11 may be
omitted. Maguire, 830 P.2d at 218. Thus, the trial court had access to this Court's
opinions which are binding and declare that trial courts must abide by all Rule 11(e)
requirements.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO INFORM HITTLE OF HIS
SUBSTANTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A SPEEDY JURY
TRIAL WAS OBVIOUS PLAIN ERROR THAT PREJUDICED
HITTLE

The record is abundantly clear that Hittle was not informed of his constitutional
right to a speedy trial as required by Rule 11(e). Hittle, 2002 UT App 134, at f 2.
This error was harmful because the omission dealt with a substantial constitutional
right.
The Court of Appeals presumed Hittle was harmed by the trial court's omission
because "by not knowing which rights a defendant is waiving, the defendant cannot
make a folly informed decision." Id. at f 10, see also State v. Ostler, 2000 UT App 28,
t 25, 996 P.2d 1065.

Hittle did not object to the trial court's omissions under Rule 11, so the Court of
Appeals reviewed his claim for plain error. Hittle, 2002 UT App 134, at \ 5. Because
this issue was first raised on appeal, Hittle could not show on the record how not
knowing about his right to a speedy jury trial affected his decision to enter a guilty
plea.
The Court of Appeals has determined that when a trial court fails to advise
defendant of his substantial constitutional rights under Rule 11, the omission is
presumed harmful. See Tarnawiecki, 2000 UT App 186 at t 18 (presuming harm when
trial court failed to inform defendant that she was entitled to a "speedy trial before an
impartial jury"); see also Ostler, 2000 UT App 28, t1 25-26 (presuming harm where
trial court failed to inform defendant that he would waive certain constitutional rights
by pleading guilty).
Because Hittle first raised this issue on appeal, and considering that the trial
court failed to advise him of his substantial constitutional right to a speedy trial, it was
virtually impossible for Hittle to show by the record that he was prejudiced by the trial
court for failing to advise him of this right. Again, the record is clear that Hittle was
not advised of this right, thus the record cannot show that Hittle voluntarily and
knowingly waived this right.
The State asserts that Hittle should be required to show that but for the trial
court's error, there is a reasonable probability he would not have pleaded guilty (Brief
of Petitioner at 13-18). But under the circumstances of this case, it is nearly impossible

for Hittle (or any other defendant who has not been advised of substantial constitutional
rights) to show that but for this error, he would not have pleaded guilty. The only way
Hittle could show that he was prejudiced is to point out in the record something to the
effect that shows he was concerned about having to face a jury trial at some distant
point in the future, and he only plead guilty to avoid this uncertain future trial date.
Almost certainly, if Hittle expressed this concern at any point during the plea hearing,
the trial court would have certainly advised him of his right to a speedy trial and thus
avoided the whole problem. The problem is that there is no evidence that Hittle knew
or understood of his right to a speedy trial and because there is no evidence of this,
there is no reason to presume that Hittle or any other defendant in his position would
express hope or a desire for such a right. By not knowing what rights he was waiving,
Hittle could not have made a fully informed decision when entering his guilty plea.
The only course of action considering these facts is to presume harm when a defendant
is not advised of a substantial constitutional right as important as this. Otherwise, how
is justice served by accepting an involuntary guilty plea while defendants do not even
know their rights?

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
For the foregoing reasons, Hittle asks this Court to affirm the Court of Appeals'
decision that a trial court must advise defendants of all substantial constitutional rights
outlined in Rule 11, including the right to a speedy trial, before a guilty plea can be

entered. In the alternative, should this Court reverse the Court of Appeals' decision,
Hittle asks this Court to remand the other issues the Court of Appeals did not reach in
Hittle. See Visserll, at \ 17.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 23rd day of June, 2003.

^n/^^y l^o
Margaret P. -Lindsay
Counsel for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I delivered four (4) true and correct copies of the foregoing
Brief of Appellant to the Utah Attorney General, 160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor, P.O.
Box 140854, Salt Lake City, UT 84114, this 23rd day of June, 2003.
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Margaret P. Lindsay
Counsel for Appellant
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GREENWOOD, Judge:
Hi
Defendant David Hittle appeals his conviction and the trial
court's denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because
the trial court failed to advise Defendant of his right to a
speedy trial under Rule 11(e)(3) of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
While conceding that the trial court failed to
advise Defendant of his right to a speedy trial under rule
LI (e)(3), the State argues that the error was harmless because
Defendant has failed to show that but for the trial court's
amission, he would have proceeded to trial. We reverse.

Defendant also argues that the trial court committed other
missions under Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
nd that his trial counsel was ineffective. Since we reverse on
he ground that the trial court failed to inform Defendant of his
ight to a speedy trial, we do not address these other issues

BACKGROUND
%2
Defendant was charged with a third degree felony and a class
A misdemeanor- for criminal non-support, m violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-7-201 (1999). During a hearing in April 2000,
Defendant pleaded guilty to the class A misdemeanor, agreed to
pay all child support arrearages, and agreed to 3 6 months
probation m exchange for the State dropping the felony charge
and the trial court suspending his one year jail sentence.
However, during the rule 11 colloquy, the trial court failed to
inform Defendant of his right to a speedy trial. The trial court
stated the following:
Do" you understand that by entering this plea
today . . . you are giving up your right to
go to trial; [your] right to confront and
cross examine witnesses, to present evidence
on your behalf or to refrain from presenting
evidence if you {] wish and to make the State
carry the burden of proving beyond reasonable
doubt all of the elements of the offense as
charged; to have witnesses brought on your
behalf to court to testify, with the
compulsion of a subpoena if necessary. You
have the right not to commit yourself unless
you choose to take the stand m which case
you would be subject to cross examination.
You have the right to, if you were to be
convicted and found guilty following a trial
by an impartial decision maker, or a jury in
this matter, you would have the right to
appeal. You're giving up those rights by
entering this plea today.
Defendant stated that he was prepared to give up those rights and
agreed that he understood the potential penalties for pleading
guilty to a class A misdemeanor. Furthermore, the Plea Agreement
Defendant signed did not include a provision waiving the right to
a -speedy trial.
%3
On May 17, 20 0 0, Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his
guilty plea. The trial court denied the motion and this appeal
followed.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1[4
Because Defendant did not object below to the trial court's
omissions under rule 11, we review Defendant's claim for plain
error. We determine whether the trial court committed plain

error as a matter of law.
(Utah Ct. App. 1994).

See State v. Brooks, 868 P.2d 818, 821

ANALYSIS
f5
Since Defendant claims for the first time on appeal that the
trial court failed to inform him of his right to a speedy trial,
Defendant must show plain error. See State v. Garcia, 2001 UT
App 19,1(6, 18 P. 3d 1123, M 'To succeed on a claim of plain error,
a defendant has the burden of showing (i) [a]n error exists; (ii)
che error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii)
the error is harmful,1" State v. Tarnawiecki, 2000 UT App
186,1(11, 5 P.'3d 1222 {citations and internal quotations omitted)
(alteration in original) . "To show obviousness of the error,
[Defendant] must show that the law was clear at the time of
trial." Garcia, 2001 UT App 19 at ^6; see also State v. Ross,
951 P.2d 236, 239 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) ("Utah courts have
repeatedly held that a trial court' s error is not plain where
there is no settled appellate law to guide the trial court.").
Our review of Defendant's claim under each element of plain error
analysis is set forth below.
%6
First, the trial court erred by failing to advise Defendant
of his right to a speedy trial. Under Rule 11(e)(3) of the Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure, a trial court may not accept a
guilty plea until it finds that the defendant knows that by
pleading guilty, he is waiving "the right to a speedy public
trial." In analyzing alleged rule 11 violations, we have held
Lhat "strict compliance, rather than substantial compliance, with
^ule 11 is reqiired when accepting a guilty plea." Tarnawiecki,
2000 UT App 186 at fl2 (emphasis added); see also State v.
laguire, 830 P.2d 216, 217 (Utah 1991). The trial court did not
strictly comply with rule 11 because it failed to advise
Defendant of his right to a speedy trial either orally or in the
Dlea affidavit. Therefore, the trial court erred.
I7
Second, this error should have been obvious to the trial
:ourt in light of our opinion in Tarnawiecki. In Tarnawiecki,
:he trial court failed to notify the defendant of her right "to a
speedy trial before an impartial jury" pursuant to rule 11. 2000
JT App 186 at Kl6. Because the defendant raised the issue for
:he first time on appeal, we applied a plain error analysis and
leld that the trial court's omission was an obvious error. See
-d. at Ul8. We reasoned that in light of Utah appellate court
)pinions requiring strict compliance with the rule 11 colloquy
requirements, the trial court should have known that failing to
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inform the defendant of her right to a "speedy trial before an
impartial jury" was error. Id at Hl9. Therefore, like
Tarnawiecki, the trial court's failure to inform Defendant of his
right to a speedy trial was an obvious error.
1J8
The State argues that the alleged error was not obvious
because Tarnawiecki is distinguishable from Defendant's case. In
Tarnawiecki, the trial court "wholly failed to advise [the]
defendant of her constitutional right to a speedy trial before an
impartial jury." Id. at 1l7. However, in Defendant's case, the
trial court omitted only the word "speedy" from the required rule
11 colloquy. Since the trial court complied with the requirements
of Tarnawiecki, with the exception of the word "speedy," the
State argues that the error was not obvious. However, because
"strict compliance, rather than substantial compliance, with Rule
11 is required when accepting a guilty plea," the State's
argument fails. Id. at 1l2. Furthermore, the constitutional
right to a speedy trial is a distinct right of criminal
defendants, separate from the right to a trial before an
impartial jury. See U.S. Const, amend. VI. Thus, a defendant
must be informed of this right and knowingly waive it in order to
enter a valid guilty plea.
%9
Finally, the trial court's omission was harmful because the
omission dealt with a substantial constitutional right. See id.
It is well established under Utah law that we will presume harm
under plain error analysis when a trial court fails to inform ~a
defendant of his constitutional rights under rule 11. See, e.g.,
Tarnawiecki, 2000 UT App 186 at Hl8 {presuming harm when trial
court failed to inform Defendant that she was entitled to a
"speedy trial before an impartial jury"); State v. Ostler, 2000
UT App 28,111(25-26, 996 P. 2d 1065 {presuming harm where trial
court failed to inform defendant that he would waive certain
constitutional rights by pleading guilty); State v. Pharris, 798
P.2d 772, 774 n.5 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (same).
UlQ The reason for presuming harm is that by not knowing which
rights a defendant is waiving, the defendant cannot make a fully
informed decision. £e£ Ostler, 2000 UT App 28 .at J25. If the
defendant is not fully informed of his rights prior to pleading
guilty, then the guilty plea cannot be voluntary. See id. We
cannot accept an involuntary guilty plea and still claim to have
done justice. Therefore, because the trial court failed to
advise Defendant of his substantial constitutional right to a
speedy trial, we presume harm.

CONCLUSION
til Because the trial court committed plain error in advising
Defendant of his rights, we reverse and remand for proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

William A. Thorne Jr.,/Judge
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Cross-References
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Harmless

error,

U R C r P 30

Rule 11

Rights of accused, Utah. C o n s t , Art I, §§ 7 to
13, § 77 1 6

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Additional time to plead
Waiver of objections
A d d i t i o n a l t i m e to p l e a d .
Where original information did not state pub
he offense and was amended so as to s t a t e
public offense for first time, as amending information m larceny prosecution so as to allege
ownership of property alleged to have been
stolen, it was equivalent of a new information
requiring arraignment of defendant and his
plea thereto, and where defendant was not

given time to plead to such information, court
committed reversible error State v Jensen, 83
U t a h 452, 30 P 2 d 203 (1934)
W a i v e r of o b j e c t i o n s .
Subdivision (c) merely reaffirms the general
legal rule that all objections, including those to
proceedings in the circuit court, must be m a d e
before a guilty plea is entered or the objections
will be waived State v Humphrey, 794 P 2d 496
(Utah Ct App 1990), rev'd on other grounds,
823 P 2d 464 (Utah 1991)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Ain.Jur.2dL — 2 1 A r n J u r 2d C r i m i n a l L a w
§ 589 et seq

C . J . S . — 22 C J S
seq.

Criminal Law § 355 e t

Rule 11. Pleas.
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infection, a defendant shall b e
represented by counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court. T h e
defendant shall not be required to plead until the defendant h a s had a
reasonable tune to confer with counsel
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by reason
of insanity, or guilty and mentally ill. A defendant may plead in the alternative
not guilty or not guilty by reason of i n s a n i t y If a defendant refuses to plead or
if a defendant corporation fails to appear, t h e court shall enter a plea of n o t
guilty.
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court.
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith b e
set for trial A defendant unable to m a k e bail shall be given a preference for a n
early trial. In cases other t h a n felonies the court shall advise t h e defendant, or
counsel, of the requirements for m a k i n g a written demand for a jury trial.
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty a n d
mentally ill, and m a y not accept t h e plea until t h e court has found:
(e)(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she h a s knowingly waived the right to counsel a n d does not desire counsel;
(e)(2) the plea is voluntarily made;
(e)(3) the defendant knows of the r i g h t to the presumption of innocence, t h e
right against compulsory self-incrimination, t h e right t o a speedy public trial
before an impartial j u r y t h e right to confront a n d cross-examine in open court
the prosecution witnesses, t h e right to compel the attendance of defense
witnesses, a n d t h a t by entering t h e plea, these rights are waived;
(e)(4)(A) t h e defendant u n d e r s t a n d s t h e n a t u r e and elements of t h e offense
to which the plea is entered, t h a t u p o n trial t h e prosecution would have t h e
burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, a n d t h a t
the plea is a n admission of all those elements;
(e)(4)(B) there is a factual basis for t h e plea. A factual basis is sufficient if i t
establishes t h a t t h e charged crime w a s actually committed by the defendant
or, if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit pulpability, t h a t t h e
prosecution h a s sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction;
(e)(5) the defendant knows the m i n i m u m a n d maximum sentence y and if
applicable, t h e minimum m a n d a t o r y n a t u r e of the Trrmirrmrn sentence, t h a t
may be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including t h e
possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences;
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(e)(6) if the tendered plea Is a result of a prior plea discussion and pl e a
agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached;
(e)(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion
to withdraw the plea; and
(e)(8) the defendant has been advised t h a t the right of appeal is limited
These findings m a y be based on questioning of the defendant on the record
or, if used, a written statement reciting these factors after t h e court has
established t h a t the defendant has read, understood, a n d acknowledged the
contents of t h e statement If the defendant cannot u n d e r s t a n d the English
language, it will be sufficient t h a t the statement has been r e a d or translated to
the defendant.
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to
inquire into or advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea.
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to
withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill is not a ground
for setting the plea aside, but may be t h e ground for extending t h e time to
m a k e a motion under Section 77-13-6.
(g)(1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or a n y other party has
agreed to request or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser included
offense, or the dismissal of other charges, the agreement shall be approved by
the court.
(g)(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by t h e court, t h e court
shall advise the defendant personally t h a t any recommendation as to sentence
is not binding on the court.
(h)(1) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any plea
agreement being made by the prosecuting attorney.
(h)(2) When a tentative plea agreement h a s been reached, t h e judge upon
request of the parties, may permit the disclosure of the tentative agreement
and the reasons for it, i n advance of t h e time for tender of t h e plea. The judge
may then indicate to t h e prosecuting attorney a n d defense counsel whether the
proposed disposition will be approved.
(h)(3) If the judge t h e n decides t h a t final disposition should not be in
conformity with the plea agreement, the judge shall advise t h e defendant and
t h e n call upon t h e defendant to either affirm or withdraw t h e plea.
(i) With approval of the court and the consent of t h e prosecution, a
defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty, guilty a n d mentally ill, or no
contest, reserving in t h e record the right, on appeal from t h e judgment, to a
review of the adverse determination of a n y specified pre-trial motion. A
defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to w i t h d r a w t h e plea.
(j) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentally ill, in addition to
t h e other requirements of this rule, the court shall hold a h e a r i n g within a
reasonable time to determine if t h e defendant is mentally ill in accordance
with U t a h Code Ann. § 77-16a-103.
(Amended effective May 1, 1993; J a n u a r y 1, 1996; November 1, 1997; November 1, 2001; November 1, 2002.)
A d v i s o r y C o m m i t t e e N o t e . — These
amendments are intended to reflect current law
without any substantive changes. The addition
of a requirement for a finding of a factual basis
i n section (e)(4)(B) tracks federal rule 11(f), and
is in accordance with prior case law. E.g. State
v. Breckenridge, 688 P.2d 440 (Utah 1983). T h e
rule now explicitly recognizes pleas u n d e r
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct.
16Q, 27 LJEd.2d 162 (1970), a n d sets forth t h e
factual basis required for those pleas. E.g.
WiUett v. Barnes, 842 R2d 860 (Utah 1992).
T h e amendments exphcitly recognize t h a t
plea affidavits, where used, m a y properly be
incorporated into t h e record w h e n the trial

Court d e t e m u n e s t h a t t h e defendant h a s read
(or been read) t h e affidavit, u n d e r s t a n d s its
contents, a n d acknowledges t h e contents. State
v. Maguire, 830 E 2 d 216 ( U t a h 1991). Proper
incorporation of plea affidavits c a n save t h e
court time, eliminate some of t h e monotony of
rote recitations of rights waived b y pleading
guilty, a n d allow a more focused a n d probing
inquiry into t h e facts of t h e offense, t h e relationship of the law to those facts, a n d whether
the plea is knowingly a n d voluntarily entered.
These benefits a r e contingent on a careful and
considered review of t h e affidavit by the defend a n t a n d proper care by t h e trial court to verify
t h a t such a review h a s actually occurred.

